Mechanization− the replacement by machines of humans engaged in production tasks− is a continuing process since the Industrial Revolution. As a result, humans have shifted to tasks machines cannot perform efficiently. The general trend until about the 1960s is the shift from manual tasks to analytical (cognitive) tasks, while, since the 1970s, because of the advancement of IT technologies, humans have shifted away from routine analytical tasks (such as simple information processing tasks) as well as routine manual tasks toward non-routine manual tasks in services as well as non-routine analytical tasks. Mechanization also has affected relative demands for workers of different skill levels and thus earnings levels and earnings inequality. The rising inequality has been the norm in economies with light labor market regulations, although the inequality fell in periods when the relative supply of skilled workers grew rapidly. This paper develops a task assignment model and examines how improvements of productivities of machines and an increase in the relative supply of skilled workers affect task assignment (which factors perform which tasks), earnings, earnings inequality, and aggregate output in order to understand the aforementioned long-run trend. JEL Classification Numbers: J24, J31, N30, O14, O33 and suggestions from seminar participants at Tohoku University are gratefully appreciated. Remaining errors are the author's own.
Introduction
Mechanization− the replacement by machines of humans (and animals) engaged in production tasks− is a continuing process since the Industrial Revolution. During the Industrial Revolution from the second half of the 18th century to the first half of the 19th century, mechanization progressed in tasks intensive in manual labor: in manufacturing, particularly in textile and metal working, machines and workers at factories replaced artisans at workshops and farmers engaged in side jobs at home; in transportation, railroads and steamboats supplanted wagons and sailboats; and in agriculture, threshing machines and reapers reduced labor input greatly. 1 During the Second Industrial Revolution from the second half of the 19th century to World War I, with the development of internal combustion engines and the utilization of electric power, mechanization proceeded further in manual tasks: in manufacturing, broader industries and production processes were mechanized with the introduction of mass production system; wider tasks were mechanized with tractors in agriculture and with automobiles and trucks in transportation. Further, some analytical (cognitive) tasks too were mechanized during the era: tabulating machines substituted workers engaged in data processing tasks and teleprinters replaced Morse code operators. In the post World War II era, especially since the 1980s, analytical tasks in much wider areas have been mechanized because of the rapid growth of IT technologies: computers replaced clerical workers engaged in information processing tasks; sensors mechanized inspection processes in manufacturing and services such as commerce and distribution; and simple trouble shooting tasks in many sectors were mechanized with the construction of databases of known troubles. 2 Consequently, humans have shifted to tasks machines cannot perform efficiently. The general trend until about the 1960s is the shift from manual tasks to analytical tasks: initially, they shifted from manual tasks at farms and cottages to manual tasks at factories and analytical tasks at offices and factories associated with clerical, management, and technical jobs; after mechanization deepened in manufacturing, they shifted away from manual tasks at factories as well as at farms to the analytical tasks. Since the 1970s, as a result of the advancement of IT technologies, humans have shifted away from routine analytical tasks at offices and factories (such as simple information processing tasks) as well as manual tasks at factories toward non-routine analytical tasks at these workplaces and non-routine manual tasks in services such as personal care, protective service, and cleaning. 3, 4 Further, as can be inferred from the shifts in tasks, mechanization has affected relative demands for workers of different skill levels and thus earnings levels and earnings inequality. In the early stage of industrialization, earnings of unskilled workers grew very moderately and earnings inequality between skilled and unskilled workers increased. 5 In later periods, unskilled workers have benefited more from mechanization, while, as before, the rising inequality has been the norm in economies with light labor market regulations, except in periods of rapid growth of the relative supply of skilled workers and in the 1940s, when the inequality fell. 6 Since the 1990s, owing to the large shift away from routine analytical tasks, wage growth of middle-wage jobs has been weak relative to both high-wage and low-wage jobs and thus 'wage polarization' has been observed in economies such as the U.S. 7 This paper develops a task assignment model and examines how improvements of productivities of machines and an increase in the relative supply of skilled workers affect task assignment (which factors perform which tasks), earnings, earnings inequality, and aggregate output in order to understand the aforementioned long-run trend.
The model economy is a static small-open competitive economy where three kinds of factors of production− skilled workers, unskilled workers, and machines− are available. Each factor is characterized by analytical ability and manual ability. Skilled workers have a higher level of analytical ability than unskilled workers, while both types of workers have the same level of manual ability, reflecting the fact that there is no strong correlation between the two abilities, except in poorest countries.
The final good is produced from inputs of a continuum of tasks that are different in the importance of analytical ability and the ease of codification (routinization) using a Leontief technology. 8 The three factors are perfectly substitutable at each task, and a unit of each factor supplies a unit of time to one of tasks inelastically. Both types of abilities contribute to production at each task (except the most manual tasks and the most analytical tasks), but the relative contribution of analytical ability is higher in tasks of the greater importance of the ability. For given the ability's importance, machines are more productive in tasks with the greater ease of codification, while, for simplicity, workers' productivities are assumed to be independent of the ease of codification. A competitive equilibrium determines task assignment, factor prices, task prices, and output etc. Comparative advantages of factors determine task assignment: unskilled (skilled) workers are assigned to relatively manual (analytical) tasks and machines are assigned to after the 1980s (such as job and wage polarization after the 1990s), 9, 10 and develop a task assignment model with three types of workers (high skill, middle skill, low skill), which is a generalization of the Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) model with two types of workers. The final good is produced from inputs of a continuum of tasks that are different in the degree of 'complexity' using a Cobb-Douglas technology. High (middle) skill workers have comparative advantages in more complex tasks against middle (low) skilled workers. After examining task assignment, earnings, and relative earnings in an economy without capital, they analyze the situation where a part of tasks initially performed by middle skill workers come to be mechanized exogenously and find that a fraction of these workers shift to tasks previously performed by the other types of workers and relative earnings of high skill workers to middle skill workers rise and those of middle skill workers to low skill workers fall, reproducing job and wage polarization. 11 The present paper builds on their work, particularly in the modeling, but there are several important differences. First, the paper is interested in the long-run trend of task shifts, earnings, and earnings inequality since the Industrial Revolution, while they focus on the developments after the 1980s, especially job and wage polarization after the 1990s. Second, the paper examines how tasks and workers strongly affected by mechanization change over time with improvements of machine abilities, whereas, because of their focus on job and wage polarization, they assume that mechanization occurs at tasks previously performed by middle skill workers. Third, in order to examine the dynamics of mechanization, the present model supposes that tasks are different in two dimensions, the importance of analytical ability and the ease of codification (routinization), while, in their model, tasks are different in one dimension, the degree of 'complexity'.
The paper is also related to the literature that theoretically examines the interaction between mechanization and economic growth, such as Givon (2006) , Zeira (1998 Zeira ( , 2006 , and Peretto and Seater (2008) . The literature is mainly interested in whether persistent growth is possible in models where economies grow through mechanization and whether the dynamics are consistent with stylized facts on growth. While the standard model assumes labor-augmenting technical change, which is labor-saving but not capital-using (and thus does not capture mechanization), Givon (2006) and Peretto and Seater (2008) consider technical change that is labor-saving and capital-using. By contrast, given technologies, 9 Similar to wage polarization, job polarization is the phenomenon where job growth is strong at highwage and low-wage jobs and it is weak at middle-wage jobs. Job polarization is identified for the first time for the U.K. economy by Goos and Manning (2003) . Later studies such as Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2006) and Goos, Manning, and Salomons (2010) find that it is observed in most developed economies. 10 Limitations of the conventional model, in which workers with different skill levels are imperfect substitutes in a macro production function, pointed out by them include: the model cannot explain stagnant or negative earnings growth of particular groups in a growing economy; typically, workers are two type and thus it cannot examine situations such as 'wage polarization'; systematic changes in job (task) composition such as 'job polarization' cannot be analyzed; since all workers with a given skill level have the same 'job', shifts in jobs and tasks performed by particular groups cannot be examined; technical change is factor-augmenting, thus it does not model mechanization through technical change, which is also pointed in the literature on growth models with mechanization reviewed below. 11 They also examine the situation where a part of tasks initially performed by middle skill workers come to be offshored exogenously. Further, they analyzed the effect of changes in factor supplies on technical change using a version of the model with endogenous factor-augmenting technical change.
Zeira (2006) examines interactions among capital accumulation, changes in factor prices, and mechanization. The Zeira (2006)'s model can be interpreted as a dynamic task assignment model after a slight modification of a production technology. However, the model assumes homogenous labor and constant productivity of machines and thus cannot examine the issue this paper focuses on.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and Section 3 derives task assignment and earnings explicitly, given machine abilities. Section 4 examines effects of improvement of machine abilities on task assignment, earnings, earnings inequality, and aggregate output, when the two abilities improve proportionately. Section 5 examines the general case in which the abilities may improve at different rates. And Section 6 concludes. Appendix contains proofs of lemmas and propositions, except Propositions 4−5 whose proofs are very lengthy and thus are posted on the author's web site. 12 
Model
Consider a static small open economy where three kinds of factors of production− skilled workers, unskilled workers, and machines− are available. All markets are perfectly competitive.
Abilities and productivities of factors: Each factor is characterized by analytical ability and manual ability. Denote analytical abilities of a skilled worker, an unskilled worker, and a machine by h, l a , and k a , respectively, where h > l a , and manual abilities of the three factors by l m , l m , and k m , respectively. Two types of workers have the same level of manual ability, reflecting the fact that there is no strong correlation between two abilities, except in poorest countries. The final good is produced from inputs of a continuum of tasks that are different in the importance of analytical ability, a ∈ [0, 1], and the ease of codification (routinization), c ∈ [0, 1]. Tasks are uniformly distributed over the (a, c) space and productivities of skilled workers, unskilled worker, and machines in task (a, c) are given by:
Except the most manual tasks (a = 0) and the most analytical tasks (a = 1), both types of abilities contribute to production in each task, but the relative contribution of analytical ability is higher in tasks with higher a. 13 For given a, machines are more productive in tasks with higher c, while, for simplicity, workers are assumed to be equally productive for any c.
Since h > l a , skilled workers have comparative advantages in more analytical tasks relative to unskilled workers. Production: At each task, the three factors are perfectly substitutable and thus the production function of task (a, c) is expressed as: 12 The address is http://www.econ.kyoto-u.ac.jp/˜yuki/english.html. 13 One interpretation of the specification is that a task with certain a is composed of the proportion a of analytical subtasks, in which only analytical ability is useful, and the proportion 1 − a of manual ones. (Due to indivisibility of the subtasks and economies of scope, one needs to perform both types of subtasks.) And the two types of subtasks requiring different abilities are perfectly substitutable in the production of a task. y(a, c) = A h (a)n h (a, c) + A l (a)n l (a, c) + cA k (a)n k (a, c), (4) where n i (a, c) (i = h, l, k) is the measure of factor i engaged in the task. The output of the task, y(a, c), may be interpreted as either an intermediate good or a direct input in final good production, which is produced by either final good producers or separate entities.
The final good production function is Leontief with equal weights on all tasks, that is, all tasks are equally essential in the production:
The Leontief specification is assumed for simplicity. Similar results would be obtained as long as different tasks are complementary in the production, although more general specifications seem to be analytically intractable. 14 Factor markets: A unit of each factor supplies a unit of time to one of tasks inelastically. Let the final good be a numeraire and let the relative price of (the output of) task (a, c) be p(a, c). Then, from profit maximization problems of intermediate producers and the inelastic supply of factors,
where w h (w l ) is earnings of a skilled (unskilled) worker, and r is interest rate (exogenous). From these equations, the basic pattern of task assignment can be derived (details are explained later). Because A h (a)
A l (a) ≤ (≥) w h w l for any (a, c) satisfying n h (a, c) = (>)0 and n l (a, c) > (=)0 and A h (a)
A l (a) increases with a, there exists unique a * ∈ (0, 1) satisfying A h (a * ) A l (a * ) = w h w l and unskilled (skilled) workers are strictly preferred to skilled (unskilled) workers for a < (>)a * . That is, unskilled (skilled) workers are assigned to relatively manual (analytical) tasks, and, as w h w l increases, the range of tasks (in terms of a) performed by unskilled (skilled) workers expands (shrinks). Of course, which factor is employed in a given task depends on the preferability of workers to machines as well. For a < a * , unskilled workers (machines) are assigned to tasks (a, c) with A l (a) cA k (a) > (<) w l r , and for a > a * , skilled workers (machines) are assigned to tasks (a, c) with A h (a) cA k (a) > (<) w h r . Comparative advantages of factors and relative factor prices determine task assignment.
Task (intermediate) markets: Because each task (intermediate good) is equally essential in final good production, y(a, c) = Y must hold for any (a, c). Thus, the following is true for any (a, c) with n h (a, c) > 0, any (a ′ , c ′ ) with n l (a ′ , c ′ ) > 0, and any (a ′′ , c ′′ ) with n k (a ′′ , c ′′ ) > 0, except for the set of measure 0 tasks in which multiple factors are employed:
Given the task assignment, factors are employed intensively in tasks in which their productivities are low. Denote the measure of total supply of factor i (i = h, l, k) by N i (N k is endogenous). Then, by substituting (9) into
The first equality of the equation is one of the two key equations, which states that task assignment must be determined so that demands for two types of workers satisfy the equality.
Since the final good is a numeraire and a unit of the final good is produced from inputs of a unit of every task, ∫∫ p(a, c)dadc = 1 (11)
where the second equation is derived using (6)−(8) with the equal sign. (12) is the second key equation, which states that task assignment must be determined so that the unit production cost of the final good equals 1.
Equilibrium: An equilibrium is defined by (6)−(8), (9), (10), (12) , and the task assign-
cA k (a) = w h r ). By using the task assignment conditions, the first equality of (10) and (12) are expressed as simultaneous equations of w h and w l . Once the factor prices and thus task assignment are determined, N k and Y (= y(a, c)) are determined from the second and third equalities of (10), respectively; n i (a, c) (i = h, l, k) is determined from (9); and p(a, c) is determined from (6) − (8).
Analysis
This section derives task assignment and earnings explicitly, given machine abilities k a and k m . So far, no assumptions are imposed on comparative advantages of machines. Until Section 5, it is assumed that ka km < la lm (< h lm ), that is, machines have comparative advantages in relatively manual tasks. Then, A l (a)
A k (a) and A h (a) A k (a) increase with a. With this assumption, the task assignment conditions can be stated more explicitly.
Task assignment conditions
Remember that, for a < a * , unskilled workers (machines) perform tasks (a, c) with A l (a) cA k (a) > (<) w l r , and for a > a * , skilled workers (machines) perform tasks (a, c)
A l (a * ) = w h w l . Further, since ka km < la lm (< h lm ), humans (machines) perform tasks with relatively high (low) a and low (high) c, and, for given c, machines perform tasks with a > a * only if they perform all tasks with a < a * . Based on this basic pattern of assignment, critical variables and functions determining task assignment, c m , c * , c a , a l (c), and a h (c), are defined next. Unskilled workers vs. machines: From the above discussion, whenever n k (a, c) > 0 for some (a, c), n k (0, 1) > 0, i.e. whenever machines are used in production, they perform the most manual and easiest-to-codify task. Define c m as A l (0) cmA k (0) = lm cmkm = w l r , that is, c m is the value of c such that a machine and an unskilled worker are indifferent at task (0, c m ). (Under the assumption ka km < la lm , c m is the lowest c satisfying n k (a, c) > 0.) Then, other (a, c)s satisfying A l (a) cA k (a) = w l r is given by A l (a) cA k (a) = lm cmkm . Define a l (c) by A l (a l (c)) A k (a l (c)) = lm km c cm . For given c, a machine and an unskilled worker are indifferent at a = a l (c) and the former (latter) is strictly preferred for a < (>)a l (c). If there exists c < 1 such that they are indifferent at a = a * , i.e. c = km lm A l (a * ) . Skilled workers vs. machines: When c * < 1, the comparison between skilled workers and machines must be made.
c cm (for given c, a skilled worker and a machine are indifferent at a = a h (c)). If there exists c < 1 satisfying A h (1)
A h (a * ) c m , machines perform some tasks at a = 1. Let c a ≡ min
} so that c a = 1 when they do not perform any tasks at a = 1. Figure 1 illustrates c m , c * , c a , a l (c), and a h (c) and thus task assignment on the (a, c) space, assuming that c m < c * < c a < 1 holds. For given a, machines perform tasks with higher c. From the assumption that machines have comparative advantages at relatively manual tasks, for given c, they perform tasks with lower a and the proportion of tasks performed by machines decreases with a, i.e. a l (c) and a h (c) are upward sloping. (These properties are satisfied when c m < c * < c a < 1 do not hold too.)
The next lemma derives a l (c) and a h (c) explicitly and state their relations with c, c m , a * , and ka km , which is used in proving lemmas and propositions below. Note that no assumptions are imposed regarding magnitude relations of analytical abilities to manual abilities, although presentations below appear to suppose h > l m , l m > l a , and k m > k a . Lemma 1 (i) a l (c) and a h (c) are expressed as:
3.2 Key equations determining equilibrium (13) and (14) of Lemma 1 express a l (c) and a h (c) as functions of c m and a * (and c). Since c * and c a are defined as
they too are functions of c m and a * . From the equations defining a * and c m , earnings too are expressed as functions of a * and c m :
Hence, the two key equations determining equilibrium, the first equality of (10) and (12), can be expressed as simultaneous equations of c m and a * (see Figure 1 for the derivation):
where c * , c a , a l (c), and a h (c) are functions of a * and c m (eqs. 13, 14, and 15). Once a * and c m are determined from (HL) and (P), c * , c a , a l (c), a h (c) and thus task assignment are determined. Then, earnings are determined from (16) and (17), and the remaining variables are determined as stated in the definition of equilibrium of the previous section. The determination of equilibrium a * and c m can be illustrated graphically using a figure depicting graphs of the key equations on the (a * , c m ) space. Since, as shown below, the shape of (HL) differs depending on whether c * and c a equal 1 or not, using (15) , the (a * , c m ) space is divided into three regions based on values of c * and c a (Figure 2 ).
When
1×A k (a * ) ≥ lm cmkm = w l r , that is, when an unskilled worker is weakly preferred to a machine at task (a, c) = (a * , 1), machines are not used in any tasks 
A l (a * ) , that is, when a skilled worker is weakly preferred to a machine at task (a, c) = (1, 1) and a machine is strictly preferred to an unskilled worker at task (a, c) = (a * , 1), machines are employed in some tasks with a > a * but not in tasks with a = 1 and c < 1,
A l (a * ) , machines are employed in some tasks with a = 1 and c < 1 and thus c * < c a < 1 holds.
Shape of (HL) and its relations with exogenous variables
Now the shape of (HL) and its relations with exogenous variables are examined. Note that the results do not depend on the assumption ka km < la lm . Lemma 2 presents the result when c * , c a ≤ 1 (c * < (>)c a when ka km < (>) h lm ), the area on or below c m = lm
A l (a * ) of Figure 2 .
a * satisfying the equation decreases with N h N l and ka km . Unlike other cases below, (HL) is independent of c m . a * satisfying the equation decreases with N h N l and ka km . As will be seen, the relation with N h N l is negative in all the cases, while the one with ka km differs in each case. The next lemma presents the result when c * ≤ c a = 1 (c * = c a only at a * = 1), the area on or below c m = lm km A k (a * ) A l (a * ) and on or above
of Figure 2 . This case arises only when lm km A k (a * )
] ⇔ c * ≤ c a = 1 (c * = c a only at a * = 1), which arises only when ka km < h lm , (HL) is expressed as
when
a * satisfying the equation decreases with c m and N h
A l (a * ) ), and decreases (increases) with ka km for small (large) c m .
Unlike the previous case, a * satisfying (HL) decreases with c m (except at c m = lm
A l (a * ) , where ∂a * ∂cm = 0), and it increases with ka km when c m is large. Finally, the next lemma presents the result when c * = c a = 1, the area on or above Figure 2 . This case arises only when lm
where a * ∈ (0, 1) holds for any c m . a * satisfying the equation decreases with c m and N h N l , and it increases with ka km (lim cm→1
a * satisfying (HL) decreases with c m as in the previous case, while it increases with ka km (lim cm→1 ∂a * ∂cm = lim cm→1 ∂a * ∂ ka km = 0, though). Figure 3 illustrates (HL) on the (a * , c m ) space and shows its relations with N h N l and ka km . The shape of (HL), i.e. negatively sloped when c a = 1 and vertical when c a < 1, can be explained intuitively for the case ka km < la lm as follows. A decrease in c m increases a l (c) and a h (c) from Lemma 1 and thus raises the proportion of tasks performed by machines (see Figure 1 ). When c a = 1, that is, machines do not perform any tasks with a = 1 and c < 1, the mechanization mainly affects unskilled workers engaged in relatively manual tasks and thus they must shift to more analytical tasks, i.e. a * increases. By contrast, when c a < 1, both types of workers are equally affected and thus a * remains unchanged. Obviously, an increase (a) Relation of (HL) with N h N l (b) Relation of (HL) with ka km Figure 3 : Shape of (HL) and its relations with N h N l and ka km in N h N l implies that a higher portion of tasks must be engaged by skilled workers and thus (HL) shifts to the left. Less straightforward is the effect of an increase in ka km , which shifts the locus to the right (left) when c m is high (low), definitely so when c * = 1 (when c a < 1). An increase in ka km weakens comparative advantages of humans in analytical tasks and thus raises a l (c) and a h (c) (from Lemma 1) and the portion of tasks performed by machines (see Figure 1 ). When c m (thus c * and c a too) is high, the mechanization mainly affects unskilled workers engaged in relatively manual tasks and thus a * must increase, while the opposite is true when c m is low.
Shape of (P) and its relations with exogenous variables
The next lemma presents the shape of (P) and its relations with k m , k a , and r.
Lemma 5 c m satisfying (P ), which is positive, increases with a * and r, and decreases with k m and k a . Figure 4 illustrates the shape of (P) and its relations with the exogenous variables. Remember that, for (P) to hold, task assignment must be determined so that the unit production cost of the final good equals 1. Since an increase in c m lowers w l = lm km r cm , a higher portion of tasks should be assigned to unskilled workers, i.e. a * must increase, and thus (P) is upward-sloping on the (a * , c m ) plane.
A l (a * ) w l , earnings of skilled workers rise so that the unit production cost is unchanged.) An increase in r raises the cost of hiring machines and thus a higher portion of tasks are assigned to humans, i.e. the locus shifts upward, while the opposite holds when abilities of machines, k m and k a , increase. The locus never intersects with c m = 0, because machines are completely useless and thus hiring machines are prohibitively expensive at the hardest-to-codify tasks.
As Figure 5 illustrates, equilibrium (a * , c m ) is determined at the intersection of the two loci. Of course, the position of the intersection depends on exogenous variables such as k m Figure 4 : Shape of (P) and its relations with k m , k a , and r and k a . The next two sections examine how increases in k m , k a , and N h N l affect the equilibrium, particularly, task assignment, earnings, earnings inequality, and aggregate output.
Suppose that abilities of machines, k m and k a , improve exogenously over time. This section examines effects of such productivity growth and an increase in N h N l on task assignment, earnings, earnings inequality, and output, when k m and k a satisfying ka km < la lm grow proportionately. As shown in Lemmas 2−4, (HL) does not shift under constant ka km and thus the analysis is much simpler in this case.
The next proposition presents the dynamics of the critical variables and functions determining task assignment of an economy undergoing the productivity growth. The results of this proposition can be understood graphically using figures similar to those in the previous section. When the level of k m is very low, there are no (a * , c m ) satisfying (P), or (P) is located at the left side of (HL) on the (a * , c m ) plane (see Figure 6 (a)). Hence, the two loci do not intersect and an equilibrium with c m < 1 does not exist. Because the manual ability of machines is very low, hiring machines is not profitable at all and thus all tasks are performed by humans, i.e. c m = 1. Figure 6 (a) illustrates an example of the determination of equilibrium c m and a * of this case. Equilibrium a * is determined at the intersection of (HL) with c m = 1. Figure 6 (b) illustrates the corresponding task assignment on the (a, c) plane, which shows that unskilled (skilled) workers perform all tasks with a < (>)a * .
When k m becomes high enough that (P) is located at the right side of (HL) at c m = 1, the two loci intersect and thus machines begin to be used, i.e. c m < 1. Note that k a is not important for the first step of mechanization, because mechanization starts from the most manual tasks in which analytical ability is of no use. Because of low machine productivities, they perform only highly manual and easy-to-codify tasks that were previously performed by unskilled workers, i.e. c * = c a = 1 holds. Figure 7 (a) and (b) respectively illustrate the determination of equilibrium c m and a * and task assignment. Figure 7 (c) presents the effect of small increases in k m and k a on the task assignment. Since machines come to perform a greater portion of highly manual and easy-to-codify tasks, a * and a l (c) increase and workers shift to more analytical and, for unskilled workers, harder-to-routinize tasks.
As k m and k a grow over time, mechanization spreads to relatively analytical tasks as well, and eventually, machines come to perform highly analytical tasks, those previously Machines perform some tasks with a > a * but not the most analytical ones, i.e. c * < c a = 1. Productivity growth raises a h (c) as well as a * and a l (c), thus skilled workers too shift to more difficult-to-codify tasks (Figure 8 (c) ).
Finally, the economy reaches the case c m < c * < c a < 1, which is illustrated in Figure 9 . Machines perform a portion of the most analytical tasks, i.e. c a < 1. Unlike the previous cases, productivity growth affects two type of workers equally and thus a * does not change, while a h (c) and a l (c) increase and thus workers shift to more difficult-to-codify tasks.
To summarize, when manual and analytical abilities of machines with ka km < la lm improve proportionately over time, mechanization starts from highly manual and easy-to-codify tasks and gradually spreads to more analytical and harder-to-routinize tasks. Eventually, machines come to perform highly analytical tasks, i.e. those previously performed by skilled workers, too. Accordingly, workers shift to tasks that are more difficult to codify and, except the final stage, more analytical.
The dynamics of task assignment accord with the long-run trend of mechanization and of shifts in tasks performed by humans detailed in the introduction, which is summarized as: initially, mechanization proceeded in tasks intensive in manual labor, while mechanization of tasks intensive in analytical labor started during the Second Industrial Revolution and has progressed in broad areas in the post World War II era (especially since the 1980s) because of the rapid growth of IT technologies; humans shifted from manual tasks to analytical tasks until about the 1960s, whereas, thereafter, they have shifted away from routine analytical tasks as well as routine manual tasks toward non-routine manual tasks in services as well as non-routine analytical tasks. 15 The proposition shows that, while skilled workers always benefit from mechanization, the effect on earnings of unskilled workers is ambiguous when mechanization mainly affects them, i.e. when c a = 1, and the effect turns positive when c a < 1. Mechanization worsens earnings inequality, w h w l , when c a = 1, while it has no effect when c a < 1. The output of the final good always increases, even if l a < h < l m and thus workers' productivities, A h (a) and A l (a), fall as they shift to more analytical tasks.
So far, the proportion of skilled workers to unskilled workers, N h N l , is held constant, which has increased over time in real economy. Thus, the next proposition examines effects of the growth of N h N l under constant machine qualities. Figure 10 illustrates the effect of an increase in N h N l on task assignment. Since skilled workers become abundant relative to unskilled workers, they take over a portion of tasks previously performed by unskilled workers, i.e. a * decreases. Further, earnings of unskilled workers rise and those of skilled workers fall, thus some tasks previously performed by unskilled workers are mechanized, i.e. a l (c) increases, while, when c * < 1, skilled workers take over some tasks performed by machines before, i.e. a h (c) decreases. That is, skilled workers shift to more manual tasks, and unskilled workers shift to harder-to-routinize tasks. The output of the final good increases even when the total population is constant, mainly because skilled workers are more productive than unskilled workers at any tasks with a > 0.
By combining the results on effects of an increase in N h N l with those of improvements of machine qualities, the model can explain the long-run trend of earnings and earnings inequality until the 1970s (except the wartime 1940s) detailed in the introduction, which is: in the early stage of industrialization when the growth of the relative supply of skilled workers was slow, earnings of unskilled workers grew very moderately and earnings inequality rose; in later periods when the relative supply of skilled workers grew faster, unskilled workers benefited more from mechanization, while, as before, the rising inequality was the norm in economies with light labor market regulations, except in periods of rapid growth of the relative supply and in the 1940s, when the inequality fell. 16 The model, however, fails to capture the trend after the 1980s, which is: earnings of unskilled workers stagnated and those of skilled workers rose until the mid 1990s in the U.S.; 17 the inequality rose greatly in the 1980s, and 'wage polarization' has proceeded since the 1990s in economies including the U.S. By contrast, the model predicts that earnings of unskilled workers increase and the inequality shrinks when highly analytical tasks are affected by mechanization, i.e. when c a < 1, and the relative supply of skilled workers rises.
Mechanization with time-varying k a k m
The previous section has examined the case in which k m and k a grow proportionately. This special case has been taken up first for analytical simplicity. However, the assumption of the proportionate growth is rather restrictive, because, according to the trend of mechanization described in the introduction, the growth of k m was apparently faster than that of k a before World War II, while k a seems to have grown faster than k m most recently. 18 This section examines the general case in which they may grow at different rates. This case is much more difficult to analyze because, as shown in Lemmas 2−4, a change in ka km 16 Combined effects of an increase in N h N l and improvements of machine qualities on task assignment accord with the trend of task shifts in real economy when c * = 1. When c * < 1, they are consistent with the fact, unless the negative effect of an increase in N h N l on a h (c) is strong (see Figure 10 ). 17 According to Acemoglu and Autor (2011) , real wages of full-time male workers without college degrees are lower in 1995 than in 1980, while wages of those with more than college education are higher. As for female workers, real wages rose during the period except for high school dropouts, but the rise was moderate for those with high school education. 18 Note that k a seems to have been positive even before the Industrial Revolution: various machines had automatic control systems whose major examples are float valve regulators used in ancient Greece and in the medieval Arab world to control devices such as water clocks, oil lamps, and the level of water in tanks, and temperature regulators of furnaces invented in early 17th century Europe.
(a) when ka km ∈ ( la lm , h lm ) (b) when ka km > h lm (> la lm ) Figure 11 : c * and c a on the (a * , c m ) space when ka km ∈ ( la lm , h lm ) and when ka km > h lm (> la lm )
shifts the graph of (HL) as well as that of (P) (see Figures 3 (b) 
} (see Figure  11 ). Shapes of a l (c) and a h (c) and their relations with other variables in these cases are different from Lemma 1 (ii) of the original case, as presented in the next lemma. 19 Lemma 6 (i) When ka km > la lm , a l (c) is defined for c ≤ c m , ∂a l (c) ∂c < 0, ∂a l (c) ∂cm > 0, and ∂a l (c) 
< 0, and ∂a h (c) ∂a * < 0. Figure 12 illustrates a l (c) and a h (c) and thus task assignment on the (a, c) space when ka km ∈ ( la lm , h lm ) (c a < 1 is assumed) and when ka km > h lm (> la lm ). Unlike the original case ka km < la lm (< h lm ), a l (c) is downward sloping and, when ka km > h lm (> la lm ), a h (c) too is downward sloping. Hence, when ka km ∈ ( la lm , h lm ), for given c, machines tend to perform tasks with intermediate a and the proportion of tasks performed by machines is highest at a = a * . When ka km > h lm (> la lm ), for given c, machines tend to perform relatively analytical tasks and the proportion of tasks performed by machines increases with a.
Based on this lemma and the ones in the previous section, effects of changes in k m and k a on task assignment, earnings, earnings inequality, and output are examined. Since results are different depending on the shape of (HL) (note Lemmas 2−4), they are presented in three separate propositions. 20, 21 The next proposition analyzes the case c m ≥ lm km A k (a * ) A l (a * ) ⇔ c * = c a = 1, 19 When ka km = la lm ( ka km = h lm ), a l (c) (a h (c)) is horizontal at c = c m and cannot be differentiable. 20 When ka km > la lm , c m = 1 is possible with c * or c a < 1. However, such situation −the most manual and easy-to-codify task is not mechanized while some of other tasks are − is unrealistic and thus is not examined. 21 As mentioned in the introduction, proofs of these propositions and Proposition 7 are very lengthy and (iii) w h , w h w l , and Y increase with k m and k a . w l increases with k a . The only difference from the constant ka km case is that w l increases when k a rises with k m unchanged. As before, with improved machine qualities, c m decreases and a * and a l (c) increase, that is, workers shift to more analytical and, for unskilled workers, harder-to-codify tasks, and earnings of skilled workers, earnings inequality, and output rise. Figure 13 for the effect of productivity growth with increasing ka km on task assignment.) Hence, when ka km rises (falls), that is, when productivity growth is such that comparative advantages of machines to humans in analytical (manual) tasks increase, unskilled workers shift to more manual (analytical) tasks under ka km > (<) la lm , and skilled workers too shift to such tasks under ka km > (<) h lm . 22 Earnings of skilled workers and output rise as Figure 14 illustrates the effect of an increase in N h N l on task assignment when ka km ∈ ( la lm , h lm ) and when ka km > h lm . (Note that c * = c a = 1 does not arise in these cases and c * < c a = 1 does not arise when ka km > h lm .) As in the original case of ka km < la lm , skilled workers take over some tasks previously performed by unskilled workers, i.e. a * decreases, and machines (skilled workers) come to perform a portion of tasks performed by unskilled workers (machines) before. However, unlike before, a l (c) is downward-sloping on the (a, c) plane and thus a l (c) decreases, and, when ka km > h lm , a h (c) too is downward-sloping and thus a h (c) increases. That is, unskilled workers shift to harder-to-routinize and more manual tasks and, when ka km ∈ ( la lm , h lm ), skilled workers shift to more manual tasks. As in the original case, earnings of unskilled (skilled) workers rise (fall), earnings inequality shrinks, and output increases.
Based on the propositions, it is examined whether the model with general productivity growth can explain the long-run trend of task shifts, earnings, and earnings inequality in real economy. Since the proportion of tasks performed by machines seems to have been and be higher in more manual tasks, it would be plausible to suppose that ka km < la lm (< h lm ) has continued to hold until now, although it may change in future. Judging from the history of mechanization and task shifts described in the introduction, k m seems to have grown faster than k a in most periods of time until around the early 1990s, after which the growth of k a appears to be faster due to the rapid advancement of IT technologies. 23 Thus, suppose that ka km falls over time when c a = 1, while, when c a < 1, ka km falls initially, then rises over time. First, the dynamics of earnings and earnings inequality are examined. Since the result when c * = c a = 1 is almost the same as the constant ka km case, the model is consistent with the actual trend in the early stage of mechanization. It accords with the trend in the intermediate stage (when c * = c a < 1) as well, because the result is same as before when ka km falls. Further, unlike the constant ka km case, the model could explain stagnated earnings of unskilled workers in the 1980s and the early 1990s and the large inequality rise in the 1980s, because the effect of productivity growth with decreasing ka km on the earnings is ambiguous and that on the inequality is positive when c * < c a < 1 (and the growth of N h N l slowdowned during the period). When ka km rises, the model predicts that earnings of unskilled workers too grow, which is consistent with the development after the 1990s. 24 Although the model with two types of workers cannot explain the wage polarization after the 1990s, the falling inequality predicted by the model may capture a part of the development, the shrinking inequality between lowskill and middle-skill workers (most recently, mildly high-skill workers as well).
As for the dynamics of task shifts, the result when c * = c a = 1 is same as the constant ka km case, and the result when c * < c a = 1 is almost same as the original case when ka km < la lm and ka km falls: a l (c) (when k a < k m ), a h (c), and a * increase over time, unless N h N l grows very strongly (further, as mentioned above, the conjecture is that the condition k a < k m can be eliminated). Hence, the dynamics accord with the long-run trend until recently− workers shift to more analytical and harder-to-routinize tasks over time. By contrast, when c * < c a < 1, while a l (c) and a h (c) increase over time (when ka km < la lm and the growth of N h N l is not very strong) as before, unlike the constant ka km case, a * increases (decreases) when ka km falls (rises). Hence, workers shift to more analytical and harder-to-routinize tasks while ka km falls, whereas after ka km starts to rise, they shift to harder-to-codify tasks overall and shift to more manual tasks at low c (footnote 22), which is consistent with the fact that the shift to non-routine manual tasks in services increased after the 1990s (footnote 15).
To summarize, the model with realistic productivity growth could explain the long-run trend of task shifts, earnings, and earnings inequality, except the wage polarization after the 1990s and a sharp decline of the inequality in the wartime 1940s.
If the rapid progress of IT technologies continues and ka km keeps rising, comparative advantages of machines to two type of workers could change over time, i.e. first, from ka km < la lm to ka km ∈ ( la lm , h lm ), then to ka km > h lm . The model predicts what will happen to task assignment, earnings, and earnings inequality under such situations. As before, both types of workers 23 The supposed turning point would be not be far off the mark considering that a decrease in the employment share of production occupations, which are intensive in manual tasks, is greatest in the 1980s and slowed down considerably after the 1990s, while a decrease in the share of clerical occupations accelerated after the 1990s, according to Acemoglu and Autor (2011) . 24 According to Acemoglu and Autor (2011) , real wages of full-time workers of all education groups exhibited sound growth in the late 1990s and in the early 2000s in the U.S. Earnings growth of low education groups are stronger for females, probably because a higher proportion of them are in growing service occupations. After around 2004, earnings of all groups except male workers with post-college education have stagnated.
shift to tasks that are more difficult to routinize (unless N h N l rises greatly, which is very unlikely). By contrast, unlike before, unskilled workers shift to more manual tasks, and, when ka km > h lm (and N h N l does not grow strongly), skilled workers too shift to such tasks (see Figures  13 and 14) . That is, an increasing proportion of workers will be engaged in relatively manual and difficult-to-codify tasks: the growth of service occupations such as personal care and protective service may continue into the future. Earnings of unskilled workers as well as those of skilled workers will rise, and earnings inequality will shrink over time, although the analysis based on the model with two types of workers would not capture the total picture, considering the recent widening inequality between mildly and extremely high-skill workers.
Conclusion
Since the Industrial Revolution, mechanization has strongly affected types of tasks humans perform, relative demands for workers of different skill levels and their earnings levels, earnings inequality, and aggregate output. This paper has developed a task assignment model and examined how improvements of qualities of machines and an increase in the relative supply of skilled workers affect these variables. The model can capture the long-run trend of these variables in real economy except 'wage polarization' after the 1990s and a sharp decline of the inequality in the wartime 1940s. The model has also been employed to examine the possible future trend of these variables when the rapid growth of IT technologies continues.
Several extensions of the model would be fruitful. First, in order to understand the recent 'wage polarization' and the future trend of earnings inequality, the model with more than two type of workers, who are different in levels of analytical ability or ability in non-routine tasks, can be constructed. Second, the model could be modified to simultaneously examine effects of international trade and offshoring and of productivity growth on the labor market.
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Appendix: Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions
Proof of Lemma 1. (i) By using (1)−(3),
(ii) From (24),
Since hk m −l m k a > l a k m −l m k a > 0 and a h (c) is defined for c ≥ c * > c m (c * > c m is from l a k m −l m k a > 0), from (25), A l (a * ) ⇔ c * ≤ 1, the expression inside the big bracket of the LHS of (HL) is expressed as 
where the last expression is derived by using A l (a l (c)) = −a l (c)(l m −l a ) + l m
which is obtained from (2) and Lemma 1 (i). When ka km ̸ = 1, by using integration by part and integration by substitution, the integration term inside the big parenthesis of (33) is expressed as
where, to obtain the last expression, (k m −k a ) lm km c * −(l m −l a )c m = (k m −k a ) A l (a * )
is used. Further, since
and
Finally, noting that the first two terms inside the big bracket of (33) are c m ln(l m ) − c * ln(A l (a * )) and
the LHS of (HL) when ka
) .
Applying l'Hôpital's rule to the above equation, the LHS of (HL) when ka km = 1 equals
[Derivation of the RHS of the equation]: When c * , c a ≤ 1, the RHS of (HL) is expressed as
where the last expression is derived by using
which is obtained from (3) and Lemma 1 (i). When ka km ̸ = 1, by using integration by part and integration by substitution, the integration term inside the big parenthesis of (43) is expressed as 
Finally, noting that the first two terms inside the big bracket of (43) are c a ln(h) − c * ln(A h (a * )) and
the RHS of (HL) when ka
By applying l'Hôpital's rule to the above equation, the LHS of (HL) when ka
[Relations of a * satisfying the equation with N h N l and ka km ]: Clearly, a * satisfying the equation decreases with N h N l . Noting that, from (41) and (51), (HL) when ka km ̸ = 1 can be expressed as
the derivative of the above equation with respect to ka km equals
where the expression inside the large bracket can be rewritten as
The expression inside the large bracket of the above equation is positive, because the expression equals 0 at ka km = 1 and its derivative with respect to ka km equals
which is negative (positive) for ka km < (>)1. Thus, noting that ln
> (<)0 for ka km < (> )1, (54) is positive. The derivative of (53) with respect to a * is positive from ∂ A l (a * )
A h (a * ) /∂a * < 0. Hence, a * satisfying (18) 
where (19) is used to derived the last equality. Hence, the same result holds when ka km = 1 as well. 
(58) When ka km ̸ = 1, by using integration by part and integration by substitution, the integration term inside the big parenthesis of the above equation is expressed as
where the third and the last expressions are derived by using c * = km lm A l (a * )
] .
(61)
Finally, noting that the first two terms inside the large parenthesis of (58) are ln(h) − c * ln(A h (a * )), the RHS of (HL) when ka km ̸ = 1 equals
(62) By applying l'Hôpital's rule to the above equation, the LHS of (HL) when ka km = 1 equals
[Relations of a * satisfying the equation with N h N l and c m ]: When ka km ̸ = 1, the derivative of the LHS−RHS of (20) with respect to a * equals
where the last equality is derived by using
A l (a * ) ).
The derivative of the LHS-RHS of (20) with respect to c m when ka km ̸ = 1 equals
where the last equality is derived by using ( and thus a * > 0.
[Relations of a * satisfying the equation with N h N l , c m , and ka km ]: Since the derivative of the LHS−RHS of (22) and (23) 
The derivative is negative because the expression inside the large parenthesis of (82) equals 0 at c m = 1 and, when ka km < (>)1, it increases (decreases) with 1−cm
